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Introduction
Security issues in North-South relations have
generally been approached separately from develop-
ment issues. This is partly because Northern countries,
especially the superpowers, are not willing to discuss
supposedly 'Northern' security problems (e.g. nuclear
arms control negotiations) with Southern states, even
though nuclear war would also damage the South.
Similarly, the literature on the New International
Economic Order (NIEO) seriously neglects Third
World and global militarisation. Discussions of
development and North-South relations have focused
around a shifting agenda of issues (e.g. absolute
poverty, human needs, the emergence of the 'newly
industrialising countries' - NICs, or the debt
problem) without addressing disarmament, except
very obliquely: for example in considering whether a
NIC like Brazil can 'graduate' as a 'Northern' country
and become a nuclear power at the same time [Hansen
1979: 175). Yet since disarmament is a global issue, it
makes no sense to analyse it separately from the
present economic crisis and developments in North-
South relations.
It is estimated that up to a billion persons in the Third
and Fourth Worlds live under near-starvation
conditions. The development strategies pursued since
the 1950s have not resolved the problem of poverty,
which has become more acute in the last 25 years. This
'structural violence', to use Galtung's graphic term,
results in part from the structure of North-South
relations, which traps the so-called 'forgotten 40 per
cent' in a vicious circle, in which lack of nutrition leads
to disease, infant mortality and low life expectancy.
The global economic crisis has aggravated this
situation, since the North has tended to shift the costs
of the recession to the Third and Fourth Worlds.
None of the demands for a New International
Economic Order formulated in the Sixth Special
Session of the UN General Assembly in 1974 included
disarmament, international restraints on arms sales or
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the transfer of military-related expenditures towards
development projects. Instead, however, it was
demanded that the developed countries meet the aid
target of 0.7 per cent of GNP established for the
Second UN Development Decade; and that the North
increase its financial commitments to the emergency
funds created in response to the food and oil price
increases in 1973-75. It was also demanded that the
North be prepared to renegotiate the terms of debt
repayment for Southern countries experiencing
serious balance of payments difficulties.
The debt problem became particularly acute in the
early 1980s. How serious it had become was illustrated
in 1982, when first Mexico and then Argentina and
Brazil were unable to meet their scheduled repayments
of principal on the external debt of their respective
public sectors. Part of this debt, especially in the cases
of Brazil and Argentina, resulted from military-
related purchases. Nevertheless, the debt problem was
not allowed to transform significantly the rules of the
game between North and South. The international
organisation of Third World debt has been worked
out on an ad hoc basis, under the aegis of the IMF,
guided by the principle that 'debts are to be serviced
promptly if there is any economic possibility of doing
so' [Lipson 1981: 606]. The usual result has been the
more or less veiled imposition of severe stabilisation
programmes that serve only to widen the North-South
gap.
In spite of Southern demands, the international
economic system has not substantially changed. It
continues operating in a manner that primarily
benefits the developed countries. This has become
increasingly clear with the weakening of the Southern
position in the last years, due (a) to internal
differentiations (e.g. between oil exporting and
importing countries) that inhibit its capacity for
collective action and (b) to the enduring world
economic recession, reducing growth rates in some
Southern countries and resulting in negative growth
rates in others. The problems of organising effective
action in the South are illustrated by the inability of
the major debtor countries to organise themselves in a
cartel similar to OPEC, as well as by the major schisms
which have developed within the latter.
Nevertheless the process of democratisation which has
been taking place in a greater number of Latin
American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay),
together with their critical economic situation have
made them more supportive of disarmament and arms
control proposals that would reduce their military
spending. In this, moreover, they have not been alone.
For example, on May 24, 1984, the recently elected
Argentine president, Raut Alfonsin, signed a joint
declaration with the Presidents of Mexico and
Tanzania and the Prime Ministers of Greece, India
and Sweden, denouncing the arms race between the
superpowers, whilst drawing attention to the dangers
for all countries of nuclear war. Democratisation does
not in itself however, ensure that Southern countries
will show an interest in disarmament, nor that they
will be able to implement it on a regional, still less a
global scale.
Disarmament and Development in Latin
America
Until very recently, disarmament and development
were discussed in Latin America, as in other regions,
as two separate issues. Development thinking (for
example, the ECLA school of thought led by Raul
Prebisch in the 1950s and 1960s) focused either on the
obstacles to capitalist development in these countries
(such as deterioration of the terms of trade), or on the
subservient forms which capitalist development
adopts in Latin America with respect to the capitalism
of the centre. In any case, the centre-periphery scheme
was conceived of largely in non-military terms, and the
international arms economy was out of the picture.
On the other hand, some Marxist theorists have begun
to emphasise the links between the internationalisation
of capital, armaments and underdevelopment.
According to this approach, the military is an agent of
underdevelopment, that is 'a mechanism for extracting
surplus product in the periphery in order to support
capitalist accumulation in the metropolis' [Kaldor
1978: 66]. This is an important advance relative to
early development thinking. Yet such a perspective
also has its problems. It would, for example, be
inadequate to analyse the emergence of a new type of
'permanent' military government in Latin America
after the 1964 Brazilian coup and of the 'national
security doctrine' by which it has been legitimised,
solely as a response to the imperatives of capitalist
development in the centre. Such an approach would
overlook internal factors and the 'relative autonomy'
of such regimes, and it would have difficulty
explaining the 'Brazilian miracle' which took place
before the oil shock of 1973-74.
Before the 1982-85 debt crisis Latin American
countries had steadily increased their military
spending (see Table 1) and imports of military
hardware despite the fact that the 1973-74 oil shock
had augmented the foreign exchange bill of the oil-
importing countries. At the same time, from the 1970s
the countries of the region had begun to diversify their
sources of armaments, traditionally supplied by the
United States.
Argentina and Chile borrowed heavily from the
Eurodollar market (even after the oil crisis) to buy
armaments. In consequence Latin American armed
forces tended to increase and modernise their
weaponry. This trend reflected the following develop-
ments: (a) the replacement of obsolete equipment; (b)
the 'demonstration effect': when one country
modernised its armed forces, neighbouring countries
followed suit; (e) the development (under the Reagan
administration) of a less restrained US arms sales
policy (exemplified by the recent sale of F-16 aircraft
to Venezuela). This in turn was partly a response (d) to
the previous diversification by Latin American
countries of their arms purchases, supporting a
tendency to adopt more flexible and independent
foreign policies with regard to neighbouring countries
and to the major world powers; this was also
associated (e) with increasing self sufficiency in arms
production, especially in Argentina and Brazil, both
of which indeed are now exporting weapons. In the
early 1980s Brazil became one of the ten largest
weapons exporting countries in the world (SIPRI
Yearbook, 1981). Moreover, these countries have
significant nuclear development programmes. Neither
Argentina nor Brazil has signed the Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT), on the grounds that it condemns non-
nuclear weapon states to permanent inferiority.
Increased armament intensified inter-state conflicts.
In December 1978 Argentina and Chile were at the
edge of war; in 1981 there was a border war between
Peruvian and Ecuadorian forces; and in April-June
1982, the Falklands/Malvinas war. The latter affected
the complex network of bilateral military relationships
between the United States and different Latin
American countries (resulting, for example, in a
cooling of relations with Argentina; and talk about the
re-establishment of the military cooperation agreement
between the US and Brazil, which had been terminated
by the Giesel administration) and, more generally, the
inter-American military system. The failure of the war
to resolve the dispute between Britain and Argentina
over the Fatklands/Malvinas remains a potential
source of new conflict. Nevertheless, the signing of a
treaty between Argentina and Chile settling the Beagle
dispute has diminished tensions in the Southern Cone.
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Table 1
Latin American Military Expenditures in US$ mn, at 1980 prices and exchange-rates, 1975-1984
Source: SIPRI Yearbook. 1985: p.270. Figures in brackets are provisional estimates.
In the 1980s the debt burden began to impose more
and more severe constraints on South American
military budgets. Brazil was on the verge of default by
November 1982 and yet began a modernisation
programme for its armed forces soon after the
Falkiands/Malvinas conflict, increasing its military
spending by some 23 per cent in constant price terms,
according to the Stockholm International Peace
Reseach Institute (SIPRI). However, Argentine
military expenditures were cut by an estimated 40 per
cent between 1982 and 1984, Venezuela's military
expenditure levelled off, and the South American total
decreased by some 18 per cent over the same period.
The tendency toward demilitarisation has been
reinforced by the inauguration of democratic
governments (in Bolivia in 1982, Argentina in 1983,
Brazil in 1985) although the latter have not always
implemented cuts in military budgets.
On the other hand, a process of militarisation is
spreading in Central America: between 1979 and
1983/84 the military budgets of El Salvador,
Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua increased in
constant price terms by 51 per cent, 31 per cent, 106
per cent and 184 per cent respectively.' US economic
and military aid to Nicaragua was terminated in mid-
1981, while US military aid to Nicaragua was
terminated in mid-1981. At the same time US military
aid to El Salvador and Honduras rose sharply from
less than $20 mn in 1980 to more than $170 mn in
1984. This process has accelerated in spite of economic.
stagnation and the severe effects of the world
economic crisis on these countries, which are far less
developed than the major South American nations.
Putting Disarmament on the Latin American
Agenda: the Ayacucho Declaration
Latin America is the only region of the world that has
been officially declared a nuclear-weapons-free zone.
The figures for EI Salvador and Honduras relate to the perioa
1979-84; those for Guatemala and Nicaragua to 1979-83.
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The 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco prohibits the testing,
use, manufacture, production or acquisition by any
means, and the receipt, storage, installation, deploy-
ment and any form of possession of nuclear weapons
in Latin America. In spite of this, however, very little
progress has been made regarding conventional
disarmament. Most of the discussion has focused on
'controlling' conflict rather than on whether and how
disarmament and development could be effectively
implemented.
At the beginning of 1974, the Peruvian President,
General Juan Velasco Alvarado, called on Latin
American countries to commit themselves to freeze
their arms purchases for one decade. Most countries
agreed to follow this initiative, with Brazil a major
exception. Simultaneously, the new US ambassador in
Lima declared that his country would contribute 'to
any measure with the purpose of limiting the arms
race'. On December 9, 1974 the 'Ayacucho Declaration'
was signed in Lima by the representatives of six
Andean Pact members: Bolivia, Chile, Colombia,
Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela, and two non-members:
Argentina and Panama. The declaration included an
agreement between the eight signatories
'to foster and support the building of a permanent
order of international peace and cooperation and
to create conditions permitting the effective
limitation of armaments and putting an end to their
acquisition for offensive military purposes, in
order to devote all the resources possible to the
economic and social development of each one of
the countries of Latin America' (unofficial
translation from the official Spanish text).
Almost immediately General Pinochet's Foreign
Minister began to raise objections to the effect that
'Peru holds more weapons than Chile and that is the
reason why our government does not agree to an arms
purchase freeze such as the one proposed by that
Central
America
1975
1,510
1976
1,720
1977
2,185
1978
2,326
1979
2,496
1980
2,495
1981
2,709
1982
[2,8471
1983
[3,029]
1984
[3,170]
South
America 8,762 9,720 10,374 10,274 10,277 10,428 10,744 [15,898] [14,160] [14,160]
country'.2 Thus right from the start, the Ayacucho
Declaration was regarded as a declaration of intent
rather than a binding agreement. In February 1975 the
six representaives of the Andean Group constituted in
Lima the First Conference of the Andean Group on
Arms Limitation. In this meeting of experts, the six
countries decided to include defensive weapons in the
Delaration because 'it was virtually impossible' to
distinguish them from offensive ones. Furthermore,
they agreed to consider the reduction of border forces,
the creation of de-militarised areas and the control of
arms inventories. However, although a list of
forbidden weapons was established (including bio-
logical, chemical, toxic and nuclear weapons, ballistic
missiles, carriers, cruisers and nuclear submarines),
and a second meeting of experts took place in
Santiago, Chile, in September of the same year, it
proved impossible to secure agreement on the types of
conventional weapons that were to be prohibited or
limited, and a treaty putting an effective bar on arms
races in the region was never signed.
The principles of the Ayacucho Declaration have been
reiterated by Latin American diplomats in several
international fora including the two UN Special
Sessions on Disarmament; and in September 1980
Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Panama and
Venezuela established a Charter of Conduct based on
these principles. Nevertheless this has not halted
regional arms races. Moreover, in spite of the
Ayacucho Declaration, the ways in which the
resources eventually made available by disarmament
would be channelled to regional and/or national
economic and social development programmes was
never analysed at an expert level. Only strictly military
issues were discussed in the 1975 meetings of Andean
pact experts referred to above. And neither
militarisation nor disarmament has been discussed by
ECLA or within other regional development agencies.
Disarmament and development are still two separate
issues in the Latin American agenda, in spite of the
overriding need to link them.
Why has it proved impossible to implement the
Ayacucho Declaration? Economic, social and political
forces, both within and outside Latin America have
made it difficult to reach agreement. Although the
process of democratisation in some countries seems to
strengthen the forces favouring regional initiatives for
disarmament and development, the survival of a
garrison state in Chile and the process of militarisation
in Central America remain major obstacles.
Latin American problems, moreover, cannot be
analysed separately from the global crisis and the New
Cold War. The deterioration in the international
2 See Clarín, Buenos Aires, 14 February 1974, declarations by
Patricio Carvajal, Chile's Foreign Minister.
situation affects the region in a number of ways. It
increases the likelihood of military intervention by
major powers (as in Central America, Grenada and
the Falklands/Malvinas). A new structure of North-
South relations has emerged, based more openly on
the threat to use military force [Luckham 1984: 3651.
The United States' covert support to the 'contras' in
Nicaragua together with economic sanctions and
indirect threats of military action are a recent and
dramatic example.
Secondly, the global crisis has economically weakened
Latin America in common with the rest of the Third
World. Debts have grown, interest rates have soared;
and so payments on external debt absorb a much
higher percentage of export earnings [Lipson 1981:
6121. To be sure, this has sometimes compelled
governments to restrain public expenditures, including
their military spending, as part of the austerity
measures imposed under IMF stabilisation pro-
grammes (e.g. Argentina has reduced its military
expenditures and also cut the budget of its nuclear
programme). However, the structural factors that
generate military spending - including the inter-
national arms economy - remain untouched.
On the other hand, the global crisis has generated
increased pressure from the South for real and
concrete steps forward in disarmament negotiations.
The above-mentioned six-nation group (Argentina,
Mexico, Tanzania, Sweden, India and Greece)
established in May 1984 is an example, as are Southern
demands that the nuclear arms race between the
superpowers be discussed at the UN conferences on
disarmament.3 Although the peace movement has not
grown as fast in Latin America as in Europe, the
process of democratisation has now created a more
propitious atmosphere for its development. Moreover,
it is clear that there is a need for a concerted action
between Third World and European countries to put
pressure on the USA and the Soviet Union for a
reduction of tension between the blocs.
Conclusion
Disarmament and development in Latin America, as
in the rest of the Third World, cannot be approached
separately from North-South and global issues. For
example, one of the demands contained in proposals
for a New International Economic Order is a
substantial increase in Northern economic aid.
However, A. Frank points out, 'military and
economic 'aid' have gone hand in hand, and much of
the former is disguised as the latter' [Frank 1979: 3J.
Far from the UN target of 0.7 per cent being reached,
official development assistance as a percentage of
See for example the speech by the Argentine representative, Julio
Carasales, at the UN Conference on Disarmament, June 1984.
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GNP has actually declined in the case of the OECD
countries, to less than half this proportion. Meanwhile,
Northern arms sales have drained increased amounts
of the scarce foreign exchange required for develop-
ment. For example US military grants have been
largely replaced by commercial arms sales - although
under the Reagan administration there has taken place
a partial reversal of this trend, with military aid again
being offered to countries of vital strategic interest to
the United States, especially those able to offer it
military bases and facilities (i.e. surrender part of their
sovereignty) in return.
Even if a nuclear-free world is not probable in the
foreseeable future, the superpowers have at least a
common interest in avoiding nuclear war (the idea of
'common security' described in the Palme Report).
However, a more coordinated approach to disarma-
ment and development issues is required, in order to
resolve the inequity of the international economic
system and to put 'general and complete disarmament'
back on the international agenda. For example,
proposals for the creation of an international
disarmament organisation [Myrdal 1976: 297, 3041
and of a World Development Authority (WDA)
[Hansen 1979: 52] could be linked and dealt with
conjointly.4
Significant nuclear and conventional arms control
agreements, reductions in military spending in the
North and a larger political role for the developing
countries in international economïc relations would
enhance the possibility of dealing more adequately
with urgent global issnes, like absolute poverty in the
The Creation of an international disarmament organisation within
the framework of the UN, as part of the process leading to 'general
and complete disarmament was included in the MeCloy-Zorin
Agreed Principles, which were approved in 1961 by the General
Assembly. The need to establish a single World Development
Authority, where decisions on international economic issues could
be coordinated, is formulated by Mahbub ul l-Iaq in The Third World
and the International Economic Order (Os'erseas Development
Council, September 1976), p.24. Haq resigned as the World Bank's
director of policy planning in March 1982. dissatisfied with the
Bank's new policies under the presidency of A. W. Clausen.
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Third and Fourth Worlds, and of beginning a process
of 'real' disarmament and development in the South.
This is not to deny that, as Alva Myrdal argues, 'some
actual arms limitation agreements can be reached
independently of the superpowers' [Mydral 1976:
3281. Nevertheless, it would be much easier to
implement regional arms limitation proposals like the
Ayacucho Declaration if the arms race could be
controlled in the North, and the resources thus saved
directed toward meeting at least some of the Southern
demands for a New International Economic Order. A
global approach remains the best way of putting
disarmament as well as development back on the
international agenda, for 'neither the arms race nor
the recession can be controlled without a major
reordering of present international anarchy' [Luckham
1984: 372].
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